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CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
FM HONG KONG
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 1109
OF 221122Z APRIL 92
HKD 021/2
USMA 1992
2B
INFO ROUTINE PEKING, UKREP JLG HONG KONG
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON
117763
MDHIAN 1096
PY
LIST?
Yo
YRTELNO 662: US/HONG KONG: THE MCCONNELL BILL
SUMMARY
1. A USEFUL MEETING WITH SENATOR MCCONNELL AT WHICH WE HAD FRIENDLY DISCUSSIONS ABOUT THE MCCONNELL BILL, CHINA'S MEN AND VIETNAMESE MIGRANTS.
DETAIL
2. SENATOR MCCONNELL, ACCOMPANIED BY THE US CONSUL-GENERAL, CALLED ON ME TODAY (22 APRIL).
3. MCCONNELL SAID THAT HE APPRECIATED CONCERNS EXPRESSED ABOUT THE REPORTING PROVISIONS IN HIS DRAFT BILL. THESE WERE NO BEING RE-WRITTEN. HE MIGHT EVEN OMIT THEM IF THAT LOOKED NECESSARY. HE BELIEVED THAT HE HAD WIDE PARTISAN SUPPORT FOR THE BILL AND WAS CONFIDENT THAT IT WOULD PASS BOTH IN THE HOUSE AND IN THE SENATE. PRESIDENT BUSH WAS LIKELY TO ACCEPT THE BILL PARTICULARLY IF THE REPORTING PROVISION WAS CHANGED. MCCONNELL THOUGHT THAT THE WHOLE PROCESS SHOULD BE COMPLETED BEFORE THE END OF THE YEAR. THE ONLY RISK HE FORESAW WAS THAT THE BILL MIGHT ATTRACT RELATED AMENDMENTS: BUT SINCE THERE WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY BE AN MFN DEBATE SOMETIME IN THE SUMMER THE LATTER WOULD BE LIKELY TO SERVE AS THE PRIME VEHICLE FOR CHINA-RELATED AMENDMENTS.
4. MCCONNELL SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THAT THE CHINESE CRITICISMS OF THE BILL WERE ROUTINE. THEY WERE WELL BELOW THE LEVEL OF THE MFN ISSUE. DID I AGREE? I TOLD HIM THAT I THOUGHT CHINESE OBJECTIONS ALTHOUGH NOT AT GRADE ONE LEVEL, WERE MORE THAN ROUTINE. THIS WAS BORNE OUT BY WHAT THEY WERE SAYING TO HMG, AND TO A LESSER EXTENT HKG. THEY SAW THE BILL AS INTERNATIONALISING THE HONG KONG ISSUE, AND WERE ALL TOO PRONE TO SEE ULTERIOR MOTIVES OR EVEN SUSPECTED BRITISH INFLUENCE. OUR OWN POSITION WAS DIFFICULT AS A RESULT. PUBLICLY WE SAID ONLY THAT IT WAS A MATTER FOR CONGRESS. PRIVATELY WE ACCEPTED THAT THE MOTIVATION FOR THE BILL WAS POSITIVE, BUT WERE CONCERNED THAT CHINESE REACTIONS MIGHT DAMAGE
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