SECRET AND PERSONAL
coid recomme я сестрений
simies in til branes relating
not a sinologist, the DS5 would need to be. The DA
and his team would need to be accomodated in GH (which
could pose problems of space). The DA would be the
principal point of contact with London (and probably with China), and a source of independent policy advice to the Governor. Beyond that, it would be up to the
Governor whether the DA took on wider roles, eg attending ExCo meetings, or maintaining contact with members of LegCo, the business community, or the other
British representatives in Hong Kong.
pro a DA would give the Governor a senior UK-based confidant, with experience of Whitehall, of diplomacy and (if possible) of China. He could give priority to ensuring that HMG's interests were protected in the
transition period, and offer independent advice alongside that from HKG.
serenadestand
to the actresinin
mydeal
Providing 'se was ble to alund Exco, ju
con it is not possible to predict exactly how a DA's role would develop. But he could become a very
influential figure in Hong Kong. The creation of such
a position would be deeply resented by the Hong Kong
covia civil service, and would aimest-certainly lead to targ
friction with the Chief Secretary A DA would be seen as introducing a barrier between the Governor and his
administration, and tending to isolate the Governor in
GH. There could be a weakening of loyalty and
commitments among civil servants at a time when Hong Kong will need as much stability and continuity as possible in the civil service. Some might see the arrival of a senior UK-based official as a bad
precedent for interference from Peking post 1997.
10.
One means of mitigating the disruptive effect of importing UK-based staff to support the Governor would
be to adopt a gradual approach. The Governor would go out to Hong Kong without support staff and inherit the existing arrangements. He could then assess his needs
PUGAED/6
SECRET AND PERSONAL