CONFIDENTIAL
willing to extend the freeze period, so after 7 June the
ordinances could be struck down on judicial review.
11. The Chinese can make a row, which could be
debilitating, and this could further slow down work in the
JLG. But on past form, the fall-out is likely to be
limited eg no linkage to the airport project. And the
Chinese have no practical power to frustrate the amendments
before 1997. (We cannot sensibly predict what they will
seek to do then, when they will themselves have to weigh the
real impact on Hong Kong).
12.
I believe that our objectives must therefore be
(a) to get the row with the Chinese out of the way as
quickly as possible;
(b) to minimize its impact on the Secretary of State's
meeting with Qian Qichen on 9 March (while bearing in mind
the leverage that meeting may afford); and
(c) quietly to get some credit with LegCo and in the UK
for sticking to our guns on the Bill of Rights. (But we must discourage crowing.)
13. HKG's proposals seem to me to meet these objectives,
although I would like them to look again at the possibility
of giving the Chinese informally and as courtesy a little
advance notice of publication of the draft amendments
(explaining that because of our difference of views on the
BOR we had judged that consultation would not be useful; and
that the SARG will be free to reconsider matters in 1997).
We should get on with amending the anti-corruption ordinances as soon as possible. Depending on the Chinese
reaction to these, we should probably then let the dust
FUTABG/5
CONFIDENTIAL
Page 120Page 121