CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL FROM UKDEL IMF/IBRD WASHINGTON
FROM UKDEL IMF/IBRD WASHINGTON
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELNO
108
a
на созрастае а серить
CM
AND TO PRIORITY UKREP JLG HONG KONG, HONG KONG, PEKING
2
014442
MDLIAN 3446
la
а
HONG KONG TELNO 698
1997 ANNUAL MEETINGS
1.
AS SUGGESTED IN PARA. 4 OF TUR, I HAVE HELD OFF TAKING ANY FURTHER ACTION WITH THE FUND AND BANK CHINESE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS OR WITH BANK/FUND STAFF ON THE OPTIONS RAISED IN MY TELNO 70, AND AM AWAITING FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS ON HOW TO PROCEED.
23/3
2.
I SHOULD SAY, HOWEVER, I HAVE DOUBTS ABOUT HOW MUCH FURTHER I WILL GET HERE WITH THE CHINESE ON THE ISSUE OF THE SUITABILITY OF THE BERLIN MODEL AS A PRECEDENT FOR THE 1997 MEETINGS. I HAVE ALREADY RAISED WITH WANG (BANK EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR) ON A PREVIOUS OCCASION (SEE MY TELNO 22 OF JANUARY 24) AND HE REPLIED TO THE EFFECT THAT SURELY THIS WAS THE KIND OF DETAIL TO BE SORTED OUT MUCH NEARER THE DATE OF THE MEETING--BUT THAT HE AGREED THAT BERLIN COULD SERVE AS A ''USEFUL PRECEDENT'' RAISING IT AGAIN AS A PRECONDITION OF GOING AHEAD RISKS GIVING THE SIGNAL TO THE CHINESE THAT WE ARE GETTING COLD FEET.
3.
·
ARE WE PREPARED TO GIVE THAT SIGNAL? SINGAPORE TELNO 115 SUGGESTS THE SIGNAL MAY ALREADY BE GETTING OUT, AND POINTS TO ONE OF THE DISADVANTAGES. WE MIGHT ALSO BE CONCERNED NOT TO GIVE SUCH AN INDICATION OF DISTRUST. BUT IF WE ARE PREPARED TO RUN THIS RISK I WONDER WHETHER WE SHOULD NOT CONSIDER A DIFFERENT APPROACH: FOR EXAMPLE COULD WE SUGGEST TO THE CHINESE THAT THERE SHOULD BE DIRECT WORKING LEVEL DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THE, UK, HONG KONG AND CHINA BEFORE MAKING A FINAL DECISION ON WHETHER TO PROCEED WITH THE INVITATIONS? COULD THE JLG MACHINERY BE USED FOR THE PURPOSE?
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CONFIDENTIAL FROM UKDEL IMF/IBRD WASHINGTON