stable Equipment
CONFIDENTIAL
In order
to be consistent with
Our position. we should:
(a)
(b)
Refuse the direct export of defence- lated equipment. including parts and technology destined for the Taiwan
its acquisition would enhance their capability
forces
i f
Refuse the indirect ex port of defence-related equipment,
third countries.
armed
eg via
t
(c) Permit the export to third countries of the following
categories even i f
i s clear that the equipment is to be subsequently ex ported to Taiwan:
technology
equipment;
for manufacture-under-licence of defence-related
parts of defence-related equipment, provided these do not constitute the majority share of the final equipment.
In either case permission for such exports would depend on the following provisos:
that the UK firm would give undertakings to avoid publicity about its part in the eventual business with Taiwan:
that the arrangement with the third country licensee manufacturer was part of a wider commercial deal and not Taiwan-specific.
f כי
'd
Permit the direct ex port of dual purpose defence equi ment
technology, where the end user is civilian 20: coast quar d Or
police.
Permit subject Lo our existing global
export of internal security equipment
authorities in Taiwan.
criteria the
destined for the
HD 2AHO
CONFIDENTIAL