mnhongkong3011 CODE 18-77
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propaganda campaign against him and had accused us, quite unjustifiably, of breaching the Joint Declaration and Basic Law. Our proposals were compatible with both. business confidence in mind, I hoped the Korean government would make the point to the Chinese when an opportunity arose that dialogue was better than confrontation. I suggested that Korea had significant investments in Hong Kong and that the current uncomprising Chinese stand could damage Hong Kong's economy and thereby Korean interests there.
6.
Mr Yun took these points on board. He agreed that Korea had significant business commitments in Hong Kong. The South Koreans were currently feeling their way in their new relationship with China and would be concentrating initially on bilateral business, but he thought that in the New Year it would be possible to make these points to the Chinese. I said we would appreciate it if they did. offered to keep him up-to-date, through our Embassy. welcomed that.
Japan
I
He
7. I made a similar pitch on 22 November when I met Mr Yoshio Nomoto, Secretary General of the Japanese Office in Taipei. Mr Nomoto is a senior Japanese diplomat and a China expert. He too took note. He was of course well aware of the implications for Taiwan of the way the handover of Hong Kong goes. (I see since that in Tokyo Prime Minister Miyazawa only "listened politely" to the Governor's proposals on Hong Kong without giving a clear signal of support).
Warwick Morris
Far Eastern Department
WH245
270 3725
1 December 1992
CC: Mr Hum
Mr Davies, FED
My Wye, RAD
Dr Reilly, Seoul (paras 5 & 6) Mr Fry, Tokyo (para 7)
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