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THAT THE PRESENT SOVEREIGN POWER HAS FULL CONFIDENCE IN THE MANAGEMENT AND PROSPECTS OF HONG KONG.
C) CIVIL SERVICE PENSION ARRANGEMENTS, WHERE HMG IS TRYING TO DECIDE WHAT ARRANGEMENTS ARE APPROPRIATE FOR HONG KONG HMOCS AGAINST AN EXTENSIVE PAST PRACTICE IN RESPECT OF OTHER COLONIAL TERRITORIES, WHICH IN SOME RESPECTS HAS EXPLICITLY PLACED HONG KONG AND OTHER RICH TERRITORIES IN A CATEGORY APART.
5. THERE MAY BE OTHER ISSUES IN THE FUTURE WHICH WILL REQUIRE DECISIONS ABOUT HARD CASH IN LONDON BUT WHICH WE HAVE NOT YET IDENTIFIED IT IS PERHAPS NOT SURPRISING, THEREFORE, THAT THOSE WHO MANAGE THE BRITISH NATIONAL RESOURCES SHOULD BE TAKING A CLOSER INTEREST THAN BEFORE IN OUR POLICY OVER HONG KONG WHICH IS BRINGING THESE ISSUES UP FOR DECISION.
6. THE SECOND BROAD AREA IS CREATED BY THE FACT THAT AS FORESHADOWED IN THE JOINT DECLARATION THE FINAL PHASE OF THE TRANSITION IS ONE WHICH WILL BRING A GREATER DEGREE OF SINO-BRITISH CONSULTATION ABOUT HONG KONG THAN IN THE PAST. SEEN FROM HERE THE WHOLE NEGOTIATION OVER THE AIRPORT MOU HAS MARKED A WATERSHED. IT IS NOT SIMPLY THAT THE CHINESE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO ARGUE THAT WE HAVE NOW MOVED INTO A SECOND QUALITATIVELY DIFFERENT PHASE OF THE TRANSITION. IT IS EVEN MORE RELEVANT THAT AS WE COME CLOSER TO 1997 THE POLITICAL THEORY IN THE JOINT DECLARATION CAND PERHAPS EVEN IN THE BASIC LAW) IS COMING UP AGAINST THE TEST OF HARD REALITY IN THE SHAPE OF HARD-NOSED FINANCIERS, BANKERS AND TREASURY OFFICIALS WHO WANT TO CALCULATE THE RISKS THAT ARE BEING UNDERTAKEN, AND WHO ARE LOOKING FOR FURTHER REASSURANCES ABOUT THE ATTITUDE OF CHINA.
7. WE HAVE HAD CONSIDERABLE EXCHANGES ABOUT HOW BEST TO GIVE SPECIFIC APPLICATION TO THE CHINESE COMMITMENTS WHICH WE HAVE ALREADY SECURED. ONE HAS ONLY TO LISTEN TO THE MTRC OR THE HSBC TO REALISE HOW PRESSING IT HAS NOW BECOME TO PIN THE CHINESE DOWN IN A MORE HARD AND FAST MANNER TO HONOURING OR AT LEAST NOT DISRUPTING THE COMMITMENTS WHICH ARE NOW BEING ENTERED INTO BEFORE 1997, AND WHICH WILL STRADDLE THAT YEAR. I REALISE ONLY TOO WELL HOW DIFFICULT THIS IS IF AT THE SAME TIME WE WISH TO RESIST A CHINESE VETO OVER DECISIONS TAKEN BY HKG BEFORE 1997 OR ANY COMPARABLE CHINESE INVOLVEMENT IN THE DECISIONS TAKEN BY THE SARG AFTER 1997.
8. THERE IS PROBABLY NOT MUCH WE CAN DO UNTIL WE KNOW THE RESULT
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