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MDLOAN 9411
4. WE WOULD ALSO HAVE TO CONSIDER THE IMPACT ON THE CHINESE IF THEY LEARNED THAT WE WERE LOBBYING THE NEW ADMINISTRATION NOT FOR RETENTION OF MFN, BUT FOR SELECTIVE TARGETTING OF CHINESE EXPORTS. WE COULD OF COURSE MAINTAIN THE LINE PUBLICLY AND WITH CONGRESS THAT WE FAVOUR UNCONDITIONAL RENEWAL, WHILE EXPLORING OPTIONS SHORT OF THAT PRIVATELY WITH CLINTON'S ADVISERS.
5. WE KNOW THAT THE AMERICAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE LOBBIED IN THE US ABOUT THE IMPACT SANCTIONS WOULD HAVE ON US INTERESTS IN HONG KONG. DO WE KNOW WHAT THEIR THINKING IS ABOUT HOW TO DEAL WITH A CLINTON ADMINISTRATION?
6.
ANY THOUGHTS (INCLUDING FROM WASHINGTON) ON HOW CHINESE RE-ACCESSION TO GATT WOULD AFFECT CONGRESS'S ABILITY TO ATTACH CONDITIONS TO CHINESE MFN STATUS WOULD ALSO BE WELCOME. WOULD RE-ACCESSION MEAN THAT CHINA WAS NO LONGER SUBJECT TO ANNUAL CERTIFICATION UNDER JACKSON-VANICK?
HURD
YYYY
DISTRIBUTION
73
ΜΑΙΝ
73
.MFN AND HONG KONG
HKD
RAD
EASD/ODA
ECONOMIC ADVISERS
PS
ERD
PS/MR GOODLAD
ESED
PS/PUS
FED
SIR J COLES
JOINT DIRECTORATE
MR CROWE
NAD
MR MILES
NEWS D
MR HUM
NNNN
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