POLICY IN CONFIDENCE
be that they are using Hong Kong for that purpose even now, the real question to be addressed is whether it would make it easier for them to operate (which presumably it would) and whether in practice a regime could be devised that was sufficiently robust to make such dealings apparent if they
occurred on a large enough scale to cause concern. A
relatively simple system of import and export documentation
ought in theory to provide adequate insurance. It would,
however, be immensely burdensome.
The Involvement of China in Proliferation Trade Consideration of the position of Hong Kong has in the past been looked at almost exclusively in the context of the COCOM controls. However, it is conceivable that by 1997 such controls will no longer exist. It is more likely, however, that controls will exist and will be augmented in respect of attempts to stop nuclear, missile and chemical weapon
proliferation.
Regrettably the Chinese stance on all three
types of proliferation is not good and it is quite likely that what will be exercising people's minds in 1997 is the extent to which the acquisition of Hong Kong will make it more or
less easy for China to continue such undesirable activities.
Here again the remedy would be strict export and import controls, but again they would be burdensome on those who have
to operate them and for them to be most effective the operating would have to be done outside of Hong Kong (ie by the exporting and importing third countries). To the extent
that what was involved was a narrower sub-set of goods of proliferation concern the task would be less burdensome than if it were those plus COCOM related trade.
The Extent to which Countries other than China and the Soviet
Union are still Proscribed Destinations
COCOM related concerns will be affected not only by the state of the Soviet and Chinese governments and their relations, but
also to the extent that other South East Asian countries are
still on the list of proscribed destinations. Clearly the fewer proscribed destinations there are the less chance there
is of goods getting into the wrong hands. The South East Asian proscribed destinations have never, of course, been a
POLICY IN CONFIDENCE