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Argument
12. There is in practice not a great deal of difference between these two options. In both cases, we would be using reserve powers to block an attempt by LegCo to amend its constitution using the CLVA. The difference is that with the first Option we would be relying on existing general powers for the Governor to refuse assent or reserve a Bill for London. In the second Option we would in effect be tying the Governor's hands so that he was obliged to reserve for London decision any such Bill. I am not entirely clear why he favours the latter, with its attendant risk of being seen to take new powers deliberately to frustrate LegCo's will. If his intention is to protect the Governor and transfer responsibility squarely to HMG, much the same effect could be achieved by a formal instruction from the Secretary of State that the Governor should reserve such a Bill for HMG. Article X of the LP already provides that the Governor will make his decision on assenting to Bills "subject to any instructions addressed to him one of our principal Secretaries of State".
through
13. The Governor's telegram does not fully address the option of reserving a Bill for decision by HMG and we need to explore this further with him. I believe (and our Legal Advisers agree) that it is the best available option. In principle I am not attracted by the idea of increasing the already draconian reserve powers in the LP unless it is absolutely necessary. We would always have the option of producing such an amendment quickly. We would need to judge how best to respond if an actual problem ever arose. But I recommend that we seek to persuade the Governor that our first line of defence should be the powers we already have.
Prachette
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PF Ricketts
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