SE
SPL
I DO NOT/NOT THINK THAT THE CONVERSATION
REFERRED TO IN THE THIRD TIRET OF PARAGRAPH 1(I) OF NO TUR IS OF SUFFICIENT IMPORTANCE TO BE SINGLED OUT FOR
FIC MENTION IN THE OPD (K) MINUTE.
WHAT THE CHINESE MIGHT DO
3. I AGREE THAT THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S POINTS MIGHT BE MET IN PART BY BRINGING TOGETHER THE VARIOUS SECTIONS IN THE CURRENT DRAFT DEALING WITH CHINESE STRATEGY AND TACTICS. BUT I THINK THAT MINISTERS SHOULD BE WARNED, IF NECESSARY IN A SEPARATE PIECE OF PAPER, THAT THE PRESENT CHINESE LINE CLEARLY EMANATES FROM INSTRUCTIONS ISSUED BY DENG, AND THAT THE LINE IS ONLY LIKELY TO BE CHANGED, AT LEAST IN THE SHORT TERM, ON THE BASIS OF FRESH INSTRUCTIONS FROM THAT QUARTER. EVIDENCE IS ACCUMULATING THAT THE CHINESE ARE IN AN EXCEPTIONALLY TOUGH AND BELLIGERENT MOOD. SOME OF IT WAS SUMMARISED IN HONG KONG TELNO 2636. THERE HAVE SINCE 3EEN OTHER REPORTS.
7.
I HAVE NOT MYSELF SEEN EVIDENCE TO SUGGEST THAT THE CHINESE WOULD WIND DOWN THEIR CAMPAIGN AFTER A VOTE IN LEGCO TO APPROVE THE GOVERNOR'S PROPOSALS AND I DO NOT THINK MINISTERS SHOULD BE GIVEN THE IMPRESSION THAT WE THINK THAT A SERIOUS POSSIBILITY. THE INDICATIONS ARE THAT THEY WOULD INTENSIFY THE CAMPAIGN, AND SEEK BY OTHER MEANS TO FRUSTRATE THE HOLDING OF ELECTIONS ON A DISAGREED BASIS.
8.
AS I HAVE SAID IN EARLIER TELEGRAMS, I DO NOT THINK THAT THE CHINESE WOULD RESORT TO TACTICS WHICH WOULD ADVERSELY AFFECT THE MATERIAL WELL-BEING OF HONG KONG PEOPLE: THEIR QUARREL IS WITH THE GOVERNOR AND WITH THE HONG KONG AND BRITISH GOVERNMENTS. I THEREFORE THINK THAT THE DRAFT PAPER IS RIGHT TO RULE OUT EXTREME ACTIONS SUCH AS CUTTING OFF WATER OR FOOD SUPPLIES. BUT MEASURES THEY COULD TAKE INCLUDE RELAXING VIGILANCE IN THE BORDER AREAS SO THAT THERE WAS A SHARPLY INCREASED FLOW OF ILLEGAL IMMIGRANTS INTO HONG KONG, AND AUTHORISING ACTIONS SUCH AS MORE AGGRESSIVE ANTI-SMUGGLING PATROLLING NEAR OR IN HONG KONG WATERS. IF THE DISPUTE DRAGS ON THEY COULD ALSO SEEK TO BRING PRESSURE TO BEAR ON HMG BY PENALISING BRITISH FIRMS WHICH DO BUSINESS WITH CHINA (CF THEIR BEHAVIOUR TOWARDS THE FRENCH IN CONNECTION WITH POSSIBLE MIRAGE SALES TO TAIWAN).
CARDS IN OUR HAND
9. FOR ALL THEIR THREATS AND BLUSTER, THE CHINESE KNOW THAT THE TRANSITION TO CHINESE SOVEREIGNTY WILL NOT BE EASY AND THAT, AT THE LEAST, THEIR TASK WILL BE MADE MUCH MORE DIFFICULT IF THEY DO NOT HAVE OUR COOPERATION. THIS IS PERHAPS THE STRONGEST CARD WE HAVE. WE COULD PERHAPS KEEP IT IN THEIR MIND BY REMINDING THEM OF THE GOVERNOR'S WILLINGNESS TO DISCUSS COOPERATION ON CIVIL SERVICE MATTERS, AND OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THE CONFIDENTIAL FINANCIAL DIALOGUE.
10.
THE ADVENT OF THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION COULD/COULD WORK TO OUR ADVANTAGE: THE CHINESE TAKE THEIR RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES MORE SERIOUSLY THAN THEY DO THOSE WITH ANY OTHER WESTERN COUNTRY. WE SHOULD CERTAINLY MAKE WHAT PLAY WE CAN WITH OUR WILLINGNESS TO LOBBY THE NEW ADMINISTRATION OVER MFN (THOUGH THE CHINESE WILL POINT OUT THAT WE ARE DOING SO TO FURTHER HONG KONG'S AND OUR OWN INTERESTS, NOT THEIRS). WE COULD ALSO USE THE ARGUMENT WITH THEM THAT OPPOSING THE GOVERNOR'S PROPOSALS FOR THE 1995 ELECTIONS AND THEIR BULLYING TACTICS ON HONG KONG GENERALLY WILL BE LIKELY TO STIR UP ANTI-CHINA FEELINGS IN CONGRESS. ON THE OTHER HAND, IF CHINA/US RELATIONS SERIOUSLY DETERIORATE THE CHINESE COULD BECOME MORE BLOODY MINDED AND OTHERS MIGHT GET HURT
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ABC SMI
SECT.
OVELLA