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I have seen is that the Chinese might deliberately ease off the pressure on LegCo members so that the Governor's proposals passed, and the Chinese would then feel free to wipe the slate clean.
5. The Governor accepts that the possibility of extreme Chinese overreaction exists, and that we must therefore try to re-engage the Chinese in discussion. But he would give more weight to the constraints operating on the Chinese: in particular the effect that extreme action against Hong Kong would have on their international position. He has asked me to give further thought to how we might go about what was described in OPD (K) on 18 November as "discreetly internationalising the dispute". I will do so: meanwhile the draft paper makes a brief reference to this aspect.
6.
The Governor is very dependent on the votes of the liberals in LegCo to pass his proposals or something like them. This limits sharply his freedom of manoevre in exploring alternatives with other LegCo members or the Chinese. In practice he and we are trapped between Chinese intransigence and the liberals' hyper-sensitivity that Britain will – as before bow to Chinese pressure.
deeth
PF Ricketts
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