CONFIDENTIAL
D
record of the meeting between the Secretary of State and Mr Portillo, also attended by Mr Patten, on 2 July;
E
F
copies of the Governor's letter of 13 October to the Secretary of State and the Secretary of State's reply of 27 October.
2. On the basis of our contacts with Treasury officials, we believe that Mr Portillo's tactics may be:
(i) to accept in principle that HMG should provide a pension safeguard but to haggle over the details. He may say that the safeguard should not give Hong Kong officers a better deal than enjoyed by UK civil servants of equivalent rank. This thinking underlies Option B in the paper (UK comparator), which would be extremely difficult to administer. The same result can be achieved by adjusting the trigger level in Option A (Fixed Trigger). Mr Portillo may therefore be willing to accept a trigger level of 30.1, to give himself room to be beaten down to 22.1.
(ii) to argue that HMG need protect only the non-commutable element of the pension and that still further work is needed on a private sector scheme to safeguard the commutable element. The Bank of England consider that such a scheme should be feasible even if there is no HMG guarantee against default by the SARG; but Hong Kong Bank have advised us that they could not offer an effective scheme without such a guarantee. The Treasury do not want to offer a guarantee, but they may consider subsidising the costs involved in a private sector scheme. Mr Portillo may argue that more costings are needed, and perhaps views from a second financial institution. He may, in consequence, argue that a decision on the details of a sterling safeguard must be deferred until the
sub.overs.civils.ADM CONFIDENTIAL
JEB