RESTRICTED
continuation of British administration after 1997) or that,
if there were a change, they would receive a package of arrangements, as outlined in the White Papers and implemented elsewhere and set out in para 3 above.
7. The tone of our communications with the HMOCs
Association had been most unsympathetic and in marked contrast with the tone in para 4 of the 1960 White Paper,
which recognised the pressures on HMOCS officers. We had shown no humane understanding of the anguish felt by many in Hong Kong, both about the ending of their HMOCS status and about the wider issues (which concerned local colleagues
too, as shown by the emigration figures).
8.
They did not wish to press for arrangements designed to
cause an exodus in 1997, but that was no reason for not providing opportunities for those who wished to leave to do so on reasonable terms. If we wished to provide incentives to stay, the Committee had no objection, but they must be real and separate from a proper compensation scheme. Whatever HMG did many officers both expatriate and local
would wish to leave in 1997. Many locals were already
leaving. Unless HMG provided a traditional package of arrangements for HMOCS officers, the exodus would take place now rather than in 1997. HMG might wish to consider arrangements for a gradual run-down of HMOCS officers, beginning well before 30 June 1997. (See date of compensation at para 18 below). It was unlikely that the SAR would want expatriate officers to stay for long after 1997, whatever the official line now. Creative thinking was
needed if there were to be orderly departures, rather than a
sudden exodus, and the maximum long-term continuity: offering HMOCS officers the option to move on to contract terms might be one way forward.
NJCACN/4
RESTRICTED