SECRET
86
153574
нка 233/1
MDHOAN 1106
SECRET FM FCO
TO DESKBY 10020OZ HONG KONG
TELNO 452
OF 09180OZ MARCH 92
INFO DESKBY 10020OZ UKREP JLG HONG KONG, PEKING
78
79
77
YOUR TELNOS 732 AND 733 AND UKREP JLG TELNO 80: HMOCS: BRIEFING
THE CHINESE
1.
2.
WE HAVE REFLECTED FURTHER ON TACTICS.
SUBJECT TO PEKING'S VIEWS, WE EXPECT THE CHINESE TO SUSPECT THAT ANY ARRANGEMENTS WE MAKE FOR HMOCS ARE DESIGNED:
(A) TO ENSURE THAT BRITAIN IS ABLE TO USE HMOCS OFFICERS IN ORDER TO CONTINUE TO EXERCISE ITS INFLUENCE OVER THE HONG KONG ADMINISTRATION AFTER 1997: AND
(B) TO LINE EXPATRIATES' POCKETS BEFORE THEY QUIT IN OR BEFORE 1997, LEAVING HONG KONG IN A MESS.
THE LOGICAL INCONSISTENCY BETWEEN THE TWO POSITIONS IS ON PAST FORM UNLIKELY TO CAUSE THE CHINESE MUCH DIFFICULTY, BUT WE IMAGINE THAT (A) IS LIKELY TO BE THEIR PREDOMINANT CONCERN.
3. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, IT SEEMS BETTER FOR US NOT TO EMPHASISE THE INDUCEMENT ELEMENT OF THE COMPENSATION/INCENTIVE SCHEME BUT MERELY TO POINT OUT THAT THE SCHEME HAS BEEN DESIGNED NOT/NOT TO PROVIDE AN INCENTIVE FOR PEOPLE TO LEAVE IN OR BEFORE 1997. THE TITLE OF THE SCHEME MAY ITSELF RAISE HACKLES BOTH WITH THE CHINESE AND, SUBJECT TO YOUR VIEWS, WITH LOCAL HONG KONG CIVIL SERVANTS (WE NOTE YOUR OWN FREQUENT USE OF THE OLD ''GENERAL COMPENSATION SCHEME'' OR GCS). WE WONDER WHETHER IT WOULD BE BEST TO DESCRIBE IT AS SOMETHING LIKE AN ''HMOCS SEVERANCE AWARD''. THIS WOULD TIE IT SPECIFICALLY TO THE ENDING OF HMOCS STATUS (RATHER THAN COMPENSATION FOR CHANGE OF SOVEREIGNTY/ADMINISTRATION) AND MIGHT APPEAL TO THE CHINESE
IE THE IDEA OF CUTTING UK LINKS.
4. TACTICS WOULD BE EASIER TO DECIDE IF WE HAD ALREADY AN AGREED WHITEHALL POSITION ON THE FULL PACKAGE OF HMOCS ARRANGEMENTS. WHILE WE DO NOT, AND WHILE MINISTERS WISH TO KEEP OPEN THE POSSIBILITY OF AN HKG SOLUTION OR CONTRIBUTION TO THE
PAGE
SECRET
1