1992 would then be invested with, say, an appropriate UK institution which would probably be willing/able to
guarantee a return of about 8%. The officer would therefore lose (very roughly) 4% per annum, per annum.
5.
Beyond the 10 year time frame, he thought that institutions would begin to get very nervous and therefore would start to quote very high deduction rates.
6. Baring's were concerned at the amount of money that might be entailed. They seem to think that if the total amount institutions would need to find was roughly HK$2bn, that this would present no problems. They did not suggest an upper limit. $2bn would not cover very many officers but
it would quite easily cover all HMOCS officers who are
likely to be around and likely to retire in that time frame.
Conclusion
7.
Baring's clearly think that for an effective self limiting group of people (ie those retiring around 2002),
this could be an attractive scheme to the private sector.
It of course does not solve the problem for the narrate bulk
of people who will not retire in this period. But if HKG
were to make available such a scheme to civil servants in
general, then one can conceive of the Treasury being able to
put some money in to make it slightly more attractive for
HMOCS officers. How they would cater for HMOCS officers
retiring well beyond 2002 was obviously not discussed. I
suspect Treasury thinking is that HMG would make this scheme
available and ignore the fact that it would be essentially impracticable for many officers.
8.
The Treasury concluded that Mr Margolis's report would probably have to come to a similar conclusion and therefore
was worth waiting for and examining in more detail. The
clear hint was that if he did not come to this conclusion
they would be very suspicious. If the Margolis report did
YETAEA/2
?