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An
the decision. Such a campaign would highlight their lack of confidence in the guarantees contained in the Joint Declaration: this would be damaging in Hong Kong and internationally and would further antagonise Peking. exodus would face HKG with the decision of whether they could do more to encourage key HMOCS officers, eg in the Police Force, to stay: for example by raising salaries or improving other conditions of service (although in practice they would have to do this for all civil servants and police officers at the same rank: they could not be seen to discriminate in favour of expatriates). However, HMG could not be certain of escaping all costs, if they were to adopt this approach. If the Hong Kong dollar were to collapse, or if the SARG were to stop paying pensions, HMG might still be obliged to intervene (by the terms of the Carr- Robertson
assurance, see Annex A, that HMG would not stand aside in
the case of default or if a pensioner found himself in financial difficulties as a result of non-payment of pension).
(g) Decision to delay until nearer 1997
18.
There are precedents for this in other Dependent Territories, where in all cases safeguard schemes were not introduced until just before independence. In Hong Kong we want to persuade HMOCS officers to stay up to and beyond 1997, and therefore to give them the assurance well beforehand that their pensions are safe. HMOCS officers have to decide by June whether to transfer to a new pension scheme (involving the possibility of later retirement and other changes): they need to know by then what arrangements HMG will be making. By delaying a decision, we would encourage the HMOCS Associations to step up their pressure on HMG to reach a firm decision in their favour, and would ensure that the uncertainties, and the risk of large numbers of HMOCS deciding to leave, would remain.
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