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financial support which might be necessary from HMG to make a scheme viable. A potential attraction is that such a scheme could be applicable to all Hong Kong Civil Servants, even if HMG topped up the loans to HMOCS officers.
could, however, prove divisive if a scheme for local
officers was ruled out by HKG. We would not expect insuperable difficulties with the Chinese. Experts need to consider further whether this option could be turned into a viable scheme, and if so at what cost. HKG would need to consider whether a variant tailored to HMOCS would cause resentment among local Civil Servants, and if so, what they
could do about it.
(e) FCO/ODA Scheme
16.
This would fall well short of what HMOCS members are
expecting. They would in particular oppose the likely safeguard rate. But they would see that HMG had taken some account of their position and past commitments and the scheme would give them a degree of certainty that their pensions would not become worthless even if the Hong Kong dollar collapsed. The costs of the scheme cannot be predicted they could be zero if the Hong Kong dollar
stayed stronger than the safeguard rate or they could amount
to several hundred million pounds if it became worthless.
While the scheme would be divisive to a certain extent in
the Civil Service, the Governor is satisfied that it should be possible to contain this by pointing out that HMG were paying, pursuant to their past undertakings to HMOCS
members.
(£) Decision not to offer a Scheme
17. This would risk an exodus of HMOCS from Hong Kong before 1997, with the consequences noted above for our ability to administer Hong Kong effectively. HMOCS officers would no doubt also bring pressure to bear on HMG through Parliament and the media and would seek judicial review of
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