Making a start with ORP flights would keep up the
pressure on the camp population to volunteer, since they would know that we intended to return them if they did not. It would also allow us to return any new arrivals (they are at present too few to justify a special flight) and to continue to deport criminal offenders (whom the Vietnamese have asked us to return in groups rather than in ones and
twos as now). Once ORP II flights are initiated, it will be
difficult for the Vietnamese to turn back. They would also
help the Hong Kong Government to obtain funds from the Finance Committee for reintegration assistance; and this in turn could kick-start the full mandatory repatriation
programme.
ORP II flights, at least initially, will be more
sensitive politically than ORP I. The returnees, most of whom have been in the camps in Hong Kong for some time, are
more likely to resist repatriation than the new arrivals who
went back on the earlier flights, who were no doubt well
aware that the game was up. Hong Kong will need to handle the repatriations with great sensitivity including careful
selection of those to be returned on the first flights.
Strongly adverse press comment, in the wake of any incident,
could lead the Vietnamese to call a halt to further
repatriation flights. It might also provoke further
criticism from the Americans who while maintaining in
public their opposition to mandatory repatriation to Vietnam
have increasingly acquiesced in our repatriation flights
as media interest has fallen away.
M
Nevertheless, this offer from the Vietnamese represents
a breakthrough and we believe the risks are well worth
taking.
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