A
B│
C
D
E
لا
F
G
H
difficulties that he may encounter in the conduct of his defence in consequence of the delay due to such causes are of his own choice and making. Save in the most exceptional circumstances it would be neither unjust nor oppressive that he should be required to accept them.
As respects delay which is not brought about by the acts of the accused himself, however, the question of where responsibility lies for the delay is not generally relevant. What matters is no so much the cause of such delay as its effect; or, rather, the effects of those events which would not have happened before the trial of the accused if it had taken place with ordinary promptitude. So where the application for discharge under section 8 (3) is based upon the 'passage of time' under paragraph (b) and not on absence of good faith under paragraph (c), the court is not normally concerned with what could be an invidious task of considering whether mere inaction of the requisitioning government or its prosecuting authorities which resulted in delay was blameworthy or otherwise. Your Lordships have no occasion to do so in the instant case."
In this passage from his speech in Kakis it could, at
first sight, appear that Lord Diplock did not regard
culpability on the part of the requesting state as being
relevant. However I would draw attention to the fact that
the remarks of Lord Diplock are preceded by the word
"generally" at one stage and, at another, by the word
"normally". If Lord Diplock had intended to indicate that
the culpability of the requesting state was not a material
matter then this, as I understand it, would be inconsistent
with the approach which the House of Lords adopted in the case
of Narang.
However, I do not regard Lord Diplock as intending to
adopt a different approach. He was indicating that if the
applicant has brought the delay upon himself by his own acts
then that delay was not generally relevant; but if, on the
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