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had been effectively prepared beforehand.
Of course there
were complicating factors: Anthony Rogers' earlier leaking of a confidential briefing;
etc. But for the future, we need to ensure with HKG that JLG agreements do not hit the political community in Hong Kong cold.
11.
We should not agree to Mr Galsworthy being summoned to give evidence to LegCo. That should remain an HKG responsibility. Rita Fan and Lydia Dunn both also suggested that we should use the new LegCo members on ExCo to take soundings among their colleagues in advance of agreements being reached in the JLG, so that LegCo opinion could be factored into ExCo discussion. Mr Galsworthy could of course talk informally to LegCo members.
12.
We should not downplay the risk that the Chinese will accuse us of stirring up opposition in Hong Kong to JLG decisions. Their capacity to invent conspiracy theories is staggering. But we should go on persuading them to take a more sensible attitude to LegCo (Guo showed some signs of understanding this point).
27.(...).
Defence Lands
13. I asked many people in Government and ExCo whether they thought the defence lands issue was another CFA waiting to happen. It is worth noting the differences. People in Hong Kong have had since 1984 to get use to the idea that the PLA will be stationed there: there is no "breach of the JD"
issue. There is no need for legislation. As against that, there is a considerable downside. Many in Hong Kong will see this as another Sino-British deal imposed on Hong Kong.
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