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4.
We do of course already make a point of briefing
Community partners on our relations with China over Hong
Kong. The Asia Working Group and the Political Committee
occasionally consider these matters. Our Posts brief host
governments after JLG meetings and other major developments
eg the understanding on the airport. We also talk to Community diplomats in London. But I think we have tended
(or as a way of getting right of abode
help eg with to look on this more as an information exercise/t effort to get the Twelve to speak with one voice in dealings Vietnamese
with China.
5. However in April the Secretary of State did lobby both
the French and Italian Foreign Ministers, asking them to
speak out about Hong Kong during their visits to Peking.
Both seemed willing to do so, and their representations, together with those of the Japanese, Americans and
Australians, may have helped remind Chinese leaders that
showing a "black face", or pursuing a confrontational and
intransigent policy, on Hong Kong is not conducive to their
international interests.
schemes or
migrants)
6. The EC matters a good deal economically to China, particularly if doubts remain about the durability of
China's MFN status. I do not have China trade figures to hand but note that Hong Kong domestic exports to the FRG, UK, Netherlands and France alone amount to some HK $40
billion, as compared to HK $12 billion to Japan for example.
7. We shall talk to FED about what more we can do to
exploit our partners' potential influence in Peking. The
Hong Kong problem should mobilise not just partners' sense
of solidarity but also their national economic interests.
It may sometimes suit us to shelter behind a common position
of the Twelve, or to urge other partners to take the lead with the Chinese, on issues such as Tibet or human rights in
general. If we pursue these matters on a strictly national
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