extreme crisis. In fact Hong Kong's de facto autonomy in
all domestic matters bears little relation to the kind of
relationship laid down in the Letters Patent and Royal Instructions, which date from earlier times, when the concern was to preserve the Sovereign's control over a distant colony.
B
The Basic Law
4.
In comparison with the LP and RI the Basic Law reads as
a remarkably liberal document. The crucial difference, of
course, is that the Letters and Instructions
have been consistently applied in a liberal, hands-off manner, whereas the Basic Law is a document designed to protect Hong Kong's existing de facto autonomy from a central power which is expected to be heavy-handed and
intrusive. This is, naturally, not an argument we can use in discussion with the Chinese. And for this reason there
are certain dangers in engaging with them in too general a comparison between the SARG under the BL and the present de
jure constitutional position of Hong Kong.
5. There are, of course, restrictive aspects of the Basic Law, and features which constrain the powers of the Chief
Executive in relation to the central government. Under
BL 43 he is "accountable" to the CPG "in accordance with the
provisions of this law". Under BL 48, which lists his powers and functions, the CE is required to implement the directives relating to the Basic Law issued by the CPG. More importantly, though, BL 17 enables the Standing
Committee of the National People's Congress (NPC) to invalidate any SARG law which it considers not to be in conformity with the BL "regarding affairs within the responsibility of the Central Authority or the reltionship
between the Central Authorities and the Region".
Under
BL 18 the Standing Committee of the NPC can "declare a state of war" or, if it decides the Region is out of control and "in a state of emergency", it may issue an order applying the relevant national laws in the Region. And under BL 19
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