H of C
cc:
FED, FCO
HKD, FCO
POLAD
UKREP JLG, HONG KONG
CHANCERY PEKING
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CODE 18-77
JAPAN/HONG KONG/CHINA
1. Alan Paul (HKD) met Miyamoto (Director of China Division, MFA), Kitera (Deputy Director) and Tomita (Hong Kong desk officer) on 17 June. The main points on Japanese policy towards Hong Kong were set out in Tokyo telno 491, but I should record some other points covered in discusssion.
Bill of Rights
2. Mr Paul referred to comparatively low-key comment from the Chinese following passage of the Bill of Rights: there had been extensive bilateral consultation in the JLG beforehand to minimise the grounds for Chinese criticism. Miyamoto said that the Japanese media had reported Chinese reaction as indicating. they might seek to overturn the Bill in the future. The MFA had been wondering whether to take up this issue with the Chinese: it would be a matter of concern to Japanese business. Mr Paul underlined that the Chinese had never gone back on the principles in the Joint Declaration. They had not, for example, denied that there should be a court of final appeal although mutual suspicion was leading to delay in implementing detailed arrangements. The general difficulty was that any initiative by either the UK or Hong Kong Government since June 1989 was assumed by the Chinese to have been influenced by Tiananmen Square and therefore viewed by them with immense suspicion. He would welcome any concern expressed to the Chinese by the Japanese.
Chinese Attitudes
3. Mr Paul commented that the Chinese generally balanced the two issues of national sovereignty and the self-interest derived from Hong Kong's prosperity. It was important to continue to remind the Chinese that if things went wrong they would suffer far more than the UK. Miyamoto thought that the implications for Taiwan would loom increasingly in Chinese minds. If Hong Kong failed there would be no hope for reunification. During his visit to Washington the US had confirmed they were still ready to intervene if the Chinese tried to use force. Miyamoto also wondered whether a successful transition might be a useful precedent to help ease the situation in Tibet: his information was that the Tibetans were also showing interest in "one country two systems"
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