(c)
(d)
revolutionary demand. Thus, the activist becomes the "anti-state subversive", and his or her associates or representatives run the danger of automatically being labelled as potential co-conspirators and, therefore, counter-revolutionaries. understand all this to be well-established in the PRC itself. should like to know more.
I
I
Where policy involves such sensitive matters insensitively expressed, the exercise by SAR officials of independent critical thought in issues of high ideological relevance may be seen as reflecting an unacceptably independent political authority. In systems where political doctrine propounds that by definition "objective truth" can mean only the will of the communist party, the local position in such circumstances could be frankly dangerous if the "two systems" paradigm is not entrenched sufficiently strongly. In the PRC mainland system, doctrine may require an overt demonstration of doctrinal loyalties from officials. What will it require from SAR officials?
The process of arriving at subordinate policy decisions varies with the nature of political authority from which the local unit derives its power, and whether the superior body politic tolerates independent critical thought or action. The indications in this regard for CPG-SAR relations are complex. Who, for example, in the PRC hierarchy will the HKSAR Chief Executive have to bargain with?? And for what? And with what? How will it affect autonomy? What protection is there for others? Bargaining is very important in the PRC. The business community in Hong Kong will be very aware of it:-
"The technical complexity of many decisions (compounded by the
fact that the state is undertaking a directed modernisation effort involving thousands of projects simultaneously), in the context of an overloaded political elite with unclear decision rules, means that the elite frequently defers decision until subordinates (experts and various bureaucratic and territorial interests) are able to present them with a consensus decision. The more far-reaching the technical issue and the larger the risk of negative outcomes, the more diligently superiors desire subordinates to strike a consensus bargain that they can then approve. Most technical decisions involve trade-offs. Bargaining and consensus building is endemic to decisions in which trade-offs are involved ... The elite has to pick carefully the times it employs coercion, not only because those resources are limited, but also because the widespread use of coercion would diminish the regime's ability to motivate sectors of the populace essential for achievement of its economic goals. The present regime has concluded that technical and economic innovation is generally best achieved in a noncoercive
Power and authority still reside
environment