S.8.
Generally: -
(a) Does the Basic Law contain guarantees for Hong Kong's stability in
the event of a "change of political norms in Beijing?
=1&nd
(b) How can the British attitudes of " governmental restraint.
forbearance" be replicated once sovereignty has changed?
Specifically: -
(c)
(d)
(e)
To what extent, if at all, have today's rights and powers been diminished by the Basic Law? And why?
To what extent, if at all, is the Basic Law inconsistent with the Joint Declaration?
And why?
To what extent can any deficit be remedied consistently with the Joint Declaration? And how?
In my work, I had always assumed until quite recently that under the Joint Declaration, Hong Kong's post-1997 institutions would have as their premise the political freedom necessary to regulate the affairs within their competence. I had assumed, therefore, that Hong Kong's post-1997 institutions would be intended to be "free institutions" with adequate power and discretion, exercisable in an accountable manner. I am now of the view that my confidence has yet to be justified. issue are aspects of the relationship between the SAR executive and the SAR legislature and between the CPG legislature and the SAR judiciary. The context of the larger CPG-SAR nexus is the determining factor in some issues. (See paragraph 4.16)
At
At this point, I consider seven issues of micro-autonomy and two of macro-autonomy, in order to examine whether the PRC has taken Hong Kong's autonomy as a sufficiently serious concept in the areas in question, or whether it has sought to offer autonomy less than generously or less than fully. much more difficult to answer.
The main question is simply put; but It is this: Has the Basic Law
minimised the levels of micro-autonomy at cost to the overall level of macro-autonomy?
Micro-autonomy
(a) The Role of Legislators
(Paragraph 4.22)
(b)
The Accountability of the Executive
(Paragraph 4.23)
(c) Appointment of the Chief Executive
(d) Impeachment of the Chief Executive
(Paragraph 4.27)
(Paragraph 4.28)