minority" has probably grown appreciably since 1973. The single-minded drive of men and
women to acquire and enjoy wealth has, perhaps, given way slightly to a greater appreciation
of fundamental human rights especially in recent times. In my view, the Ordinance should
be regarded as an unique expression of the legislature's decision to respond to that
appreciation and concern for human rights, perhaps at the expense of extinguishing or
modifying other cherished rights.
The legitimate interest of a judgment creditor is to have the judgment satisfied by
payment according to the terms imposed by the court. There is also a legitimate interest in
preventing the dissipation of assets by the debtor. In the past two decades the ingenuity of
lawyers has seen the addition of a powerful 'nuclear' weapon designed to meet those interests.
in the form of the Mareva injunction. Other methods of securing payment, without
interfering with the personal liberty of the debtor, have long existed and are improved.
Looking at the Bill of Rights there is, in my view, overwhelming evidence of tipping the
scales in favour of personal liberty and freedom. Unlike the American Constitution economic
and property rights are scarcely mentioned. The legislature has not seen fit to incorporate into
domestic law the provisions of the International Covenant on Ecomonic, Social and Cultural
Rights (IC ESCR)
In coming to my conclusions on the question whether the power to make a prohibition
order is proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued, I have taken into account all of the
considerations above and the arguments of counsel, as well as certain features of the
legislation. I am unable to find any sufficient justification for the distinction between a
judgment for the payment of a specified sum of money (sub-section (I) (a)] and a judgment
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