application for the extension should be served on the judgment debtor by ordinary post
addressed to his last known address, gave leave to the judgment creditor to file a further
affidavit in support of the application, and granted an extension of the prohibition order until
the hearing of the inter partes application fixed for the 4th July 1991. Those directions were
given in open court in the presence of members of the press.
Not surprisingly the judgment debtor did not appear on the 4th July 1991; nor was he
represented. He has taken no part in these preceedings. Fortunately, the Director instructed
counsel on behalf of the judgment creditor, and I have had the immense advantage of
comprehensive and cogent submissions from Mr McCoy spread over two days. I am more
than usually grateful to him for his assistance, which has been rendered at short notice and
despite very practical difficulties of locating some of the authorities and source materials in
this novel area of jurisprudence. He has pressed the arguments on behalf of his client with
his usual vigour; but, in the best traditions of the Bar, he has also taken on something of the
role of amicus curiae by bringing to the attention of the court points and authorities favourable
to the absent judgment debtor.
Mr McCoy took me on a world tour of the jurisprudence on various measures adopted
for the greater recognition and better enforcement of human rights. In support of his basic
submission that section 52E of cap. 336 is not inconsistent with or repealed by the Ordinance
he introduced me directly and indirectly to judicial decisions and other legal sources from
Canada, the Pacific region, Africa, India and Europe. Our journey began and ended in Hong
Kong. These materials are mostly relevant to Mr McCoy's second contention that the
legislation enabling a court to make a prohibition order against a judgment debtor is not
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