HONG KONG
CONFIDENTIAL
13. There is a Hong Kong dimension that needs to be kept in mind. The Chinese are perfectly capable of keeping their bilateral relations with us distinct from their dealings with us over Hong Kong when it suits them to do so. Maintaining pressure on them over human rights in the way set out here need not therefore complicate
our
efforts to promote more cooperative relations in the JLG. But if the Chinese concluded that our campaign on
campaign on human rights had reached the point where we were promoting far reaching institutional change in China, they would be all the more suspicious of our wish to promote a faster pace of democracy in Hong Kong. It is also
likely that, by keeping up the pressure on the Chinese on human rights, we would also embolden human rights activists in Hong Kong to step up their campaign of demonstrations (there was a fairly large demonstration in Hong Kong on 29 September to mark Chinese National Day). This too will fuel Chinese anxieties about democracy in Hong Kong, and may lead them to resurrect allegations of "subversive activity" in Hong Kong.
14. There is no easy way of avoiding these side-effects of our human rights policy in China. But they reinforce the case for pursuing our dialogue with the Chinese in a constructive rather than a confrontational framework and for managing any contacts with
prominent Chinese dissidents so as to minimise the risk that these
will encourage activists in Hong Kong to stir up protest action
there.
RESOURCES
15. There are resource implications in all these suggestions. Chancery Peking is stretched already and would find it difficult (if not impossible) to take on greater monitoring and action on human rights cases without an increase in staff. A conspicuously high profile on human rights is also likely to result in more work in London (meetings with human rights groups, monitoring of lists correspondence with MPs / members of the public). So far this year
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CONFIDENTIAL