CAT/C/SR.92 Page 4
Secretary of State was empowered to refuse extradition for reasons other than those set out in that Act. He also had the right to make exclusion orders (para. 22 of the report). When his decisions affected a person's fundamental right to life, they could be contested in the courts, which were particularly vigilant and did not hesitate to quash orders to return. As to the implementation of the principle of aut dedere aut punire and the jurisdictional extent of the Criminal Justice Act under section 134, the courts of Great Britain and Northern Ireland had wide extraterritorial jurisdiction to deal with any person present in the territory of the United Kingdom, regardless of the nationality of the offender or of the victim. A person who was not extradited would be prosecuted if there was sufficient evidence to warrant proceedings being taken.
So far, no proceedings had been taken for torture under section 134.
12.
Replying to a question about the concept of "political offence", which was referred to in section 6 of the Extradition Act 1989, she said that, to her knowledge, there was no exact definition of the offence either in the United Kingdom or at the international level. It had been said that the crime must connote opposition to the Government of the requesting country on some issue connected with the political control or government of that country.
13.
As for the meaning of "oppression", she said that section 76 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 defined it as including "torture, inhuman or degrading treatment, and the use or threat of violence (whether or not amounting to torture)". Where it was represented that a confession had been so obtained, the court was required not to allow the confession to be used unless it had been established by the prosecution that it had not been obtained by such means. It was therefore for the court to decide whether there had been an element of oppression, for instance, in an interrogation. Section 11 of the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1991 did not the term "oppression", but explicitly referred to torture, inhuman or degrading treatment and to violence or threat cf violence.
14. Some members of the Committee had asked whether article 15 of the Convention was applied with respect to witness statements. The matter was governed by section 78 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act, by article 76 of the Northern Ireland Police and Criminal Evidence Order and by the general law on the exclusion of evidence. The statement of a witness to the police was admissible only with the consent of the accused. If he contested the statement, the witness had to come to court and give oral testimony. To that extent, the statement that the witness had given to the police was irrelevant. If the witness confirmed his earlier statement in oral testimony, he could be challenged by the defence. However, it was inconceivable that a person would be convicted solely on the basis of testimony,
15. Explaining paragraph 33 of the report, she said that the provisions applicable to members of the armed forces kept pace with substantive or procedural changes in civil law. Section 70 of the Army Act 1955 provided for action to be taken against army personnel who had committed acts of torture. Nevertheless, the dominant power with respect to acts of torture committed by members of the armed forces was the Chief Officer of Police, who decided whether or not to take action, If he decided not to do so, the military authorities would try the person concerned.