10
CONFIDENTIAL
HKB 306/1
065256
MDHOAN 3144
TOP COPY 2. NOV199!_ Q DIST?
CONFIDENTIAL
FM FCO
TO IMMEDIATE HONG KONG
TELNO 1861
OF 21154OZ OCTOBER 91
AND TO IMMEDIATE UKREP JLG HONG KONG, PEKING
4
&
PEKING TELNO 1731 AND YOUR TELNO 3235: RTHK CORPORATISATION
1. THANK YOU FOR THESE FURTHER COMMENTS.
WE HAVE NOW BEEN ABLE
TO CONSULT MINISTERS ABOUT THE WAY FORWARD. THEY AGREE THAT
BEFORE UKREP JLG TAKE ACTION WE NEED TO GIVE FURTHER
CONSIDERATION TO OUR OPTIONS IN THE EVENT OF A NEGATIVE CHINESE RESPONSE.
2.
IT SEEMS THAT, IF THE CHINESE RESPONDED NEGATIVELY TO CONSULTATION, WE COULD BE FACED BY TWO EQUALLY UNPALATABLE OPTIONS:
A) TO DROP CORPORATIZATION OF RTHK, AND BE HEAVILY CRITICISED IN HONG KONG AND UK FOR KOW-TOWING TO PEKING AND NOT BEING PREPARED TO STAND UP FOR THE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IN HONG KONG:
THIS WOULD SIT ODDLY WITH THE PRIME MINISTER'S APPROACH TO HUMAN RIGHTS IN CHINA.
B) TO PROCEED UNILATERALLY, RISKING A PUBLIC ROW WITH PEKING AND POSSIBLY CHINESE ACTION AIMED AT UNDERMINING OUR ABILITY TO CORPORATISE RTHK (PARA 5 OF YOUR TUR). IF THE CHINESE WERE TO SUCCEED WITH SUCH ACTION, THEN THE AUTHORITY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF HMG AND HKG IN HONG KONG WOULD BE IMPAIRED.
3. BEFORE DECIDING WHETHER TO LAUNCH INTO CONSULTATION WITH THE CHINESE, WE THEREFORE BELIEVE THAT FULLER ASSESSMENT IS NEEDED OF THE FOLLOWING AREAS:
A) CHINESE PERCEPTIONS OF RTHK, ITS CURRENT ROLE AND STAFF:
B) CHINESE INTENTIONS FOR RTHK AFTER 1997, IF ANY:
C) PUBLIC/MEDIA REACTION IN UK AND HONG KONG IF WE DROP CORPORATISATION BEFORE/AFTER CONSULTING THE CHINESE:
D) ABILITY OF THE CHINESE TO UNDERMINE A DECISION TO TAKE
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