КЕГЕЛКЛЕ
LAMDAN 7188
IV PIR BURNS
Fuk
HALNAN 7312
131844 MAR
82
AUVI
HKB 182 12
SECRET
DD 14083OZ FCOLN
FM TH 3 TO FCOLN
GRS 908
RECEIVER JA
SECRET
18 MAR 1991
FM THE HAGUE
WESK OFFIST
TO DESKBY 14083OZ FCO
WOEX
TELNO 099
OF 131847Z MARCH 91
INFO DESKBY 14003OZ HONGKONG PEKING
.
Ce: Ha/ HULD HALFED Hall
PADS fite
239
PS. PS/ Lord Carthness Ps/hand BS/PUS
Mr. McLover "Si Pery Cadirk
PERSONAL FOR BURNS, AUSS, FROM GOVERNOR (VISITING)
HONG KONG, PERSONAL FOR ACTING GOVERNOR
PEKING, PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR/CHARGE, GALSWORTHY AND EHRMAN (VISITING)
232
233
(23
238
YOUR TELNOS 67, 68 AND 71, HONG KONG TELNO 9 TO THE HAGUE AND PEKING TELNO 29 TO FCO: PADS: THE WAY AHEAD
·
(237)
1 I NOTE MINISTERS' CONCERN ABOUT QUOTING SPECIFIC FIGURES IN MY LETTER TO LU PING. CLEARLY THERE ARE RISKS INVOLVED IN DOING THIS. BUT THERE ARE ALSO RISKS IN NOT QUOTING FIGURES. THERE IS A DANGER THEN THAT LU WILL COME ARMED WITH HIS OWN HIGH FIGURES,
AND WITH INSUFFICIENT NEGOTIATING
FLEXIBILITY. NEVERTHELESS, GIVEN THAT THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S VISIT HAS NOW BEEN PUT TO THE CHINESE, I AM PREPARED TO ATTEMPT A MORE GENERAL STATEMENT. WHEN PASSING MY LETTER TO THE CHINESE, HOWEVER, I BELIEVE THE AMBASSADOR SHOULD GIVE A CLEAR HINT THAT WE ARE NOT THINKING IN TERMS OF A FIGURE OF THE SORT
2. ON THE QUESTION OF WHAT WE SHOULD SEEK IN RETURN, I AGREE WITH THE ARGUMENTS IN PEKING AND HONG KONG TURS. WE NEED TO GET ON WITH THE AIRPORT. DOING THIS WITH CHINESE BLESSING WOULD BE A SIGNIFICANT BOOST FOR CONFIDENCE, PROVIDED THAT IT IS NOT ACCOMPANIED BY ARRANGEMENTS WHICH IMPLY CHINESE INTERFERENCE IN HONG KONG BEFORE 1997. I AM RELUCTANT TO ADD MORE TO THIS PARTICULAR CHRISTMAS TREE, BOTH BECAUSE IT WOULD MAKE THE NEGOTIATIONS MORE COMPLEX AND, AS POINTED OUT IN PEKING TUR, BECAUSE WE ARE UNLIKELY TO GET ANYTHING MORE SATISFACTORY THAN A RESTATEMENT OF THE JOINT DECLARATION. INDEED, THE CHINESE WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY ARGUE FOR THE INCLUSION OF POINTS WHICH WE WOULD SEE AS AN EROSION OF THE JOINT DECLARATION. I WOULD HOWEVER BE ABLE TO PUT TO LU PING GENERAL POINTS ABOUT AN IMPROVED AND MORE PRACTICAL RELATIONSHIP OVER HONG KONG WHICH THE SECRETARY OF STATE WOULD WISH TO CONFIRM WITH CHINESE LEADERS WHEN IN PEKING ON TOP OF THE AIRPORT AGREEMENT.
3. I AM NOT ATTRACTED BY THE IDEA OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE REACHING A GENERAL PHILOSOPHICAL AGREEMENT ON HOW TO HANDLE MAJOR ISSUES DURING HIS VISIT TO PEKING AND LEAVING THE DETAILS OF THE AIRPORT TO BE SETTLED LATER. THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S VISIT REPRESENTS THE PEAK OF OUR LEVERAGE. THE CHINESE MAY WELL BE HAPPY TO SETTLE FOR A GENERAL STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES. THE PROOF OF WHETHER THIS WOULD WORK WOULD BE IN THE DETAIL. THIS COULD WELL TAKE CONSIDERABLE TIME TO NEGOTIATE ONCE OUR TIMING LEVERAGE HAD GONE. FURTHERMORE, EXPERIENCE SHOWS THAT THE BEST WAY TO GET WHAT WE WANT FROM THE CHINESE IS TO WORK OUT AS MUCH DETAIL AS POSSIBLE
Redacted Under FOI Exemption Sec 27(1)(a)(c)(d)