(c)
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Redacted under FOI exemption section 27 (1)|
A narrower road, ie dual two-lanes only:-
i)
ii)
much more expensive to widen later;
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high risk if the railway was deferred; a two lane carriage-way is very vulnerable to blockages and accidents.
No railway: -
(d)
i)
ii)
iii)
iv)
this would leave only one congested road which would also have to serve an expanding port; more reliance on expensive tunnels;
further delay in order to redesign the Lantau fixed crossing;
no relief for Nathan Road corridor;
3.
(e)
(f)
No West Kowloon reclamation:
But a land-fall would be needed anyway for the Western harbour crossing which was essential to relieve congestion.
-
Less reclamation to the north of Stonecutters:
This would leave a large belt of stagnant dead water.
i)
ii)
Existing port facilities could not then be moved, so necessitating a further hump-back bridge.
The general point was made that it would be a transparent sleight of hand to leave the road and railway improvements to the Public Works programme (some HK$ 75 million). They would have to have priority at the expense of cutting back other plans for sewage, housing and transport. There would be too much political pain.
4. It was also clear that the annex on borrowing was a key ingredient of the paper.
and of course no HKG
decisions had been taken. But there were substantial opportunities for borrowing by the MTR and Airport Authority; by the private sector airport tenants; and by BOT procedures for the harbour crossing. The MTR's financial position was particularly good and improving. This would ease the costs of the deferred options as would the deferral of such things as the Wanchai reclamation until after 1997. HKG are thinking of 2 to 3 year government bonds and expect to benefit from export credits. The Secretary for the Treasury recognised that the figures used in the paper were vulnerable to changed assumptions, inflation, recession or Chinese hostility. But the figures were more modest
made good sense.
ALDAFR
and still
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