SECRET
FM HONG KONG
TO DESKBY 15083OZ F C O
TELNO 141
OF 150635Z JANUARY 91
INFO IMMEDIATE PEKING
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115702 MDHIAN 8478
PERSONAL FOR MCLAREN, DUSS FROM GOVERNOR PEKING PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR
MY VISIT TO PEKING: PADS: GULF
I CONTINUE TO RECEIVE A GOOD DEAL OF ADVICE, EG. IN EXCO THIS MORNING, AGAINST GOING TO PEKING NEXT WEEK. THE ARGUMENT IS THAT, IN THEIR PRESENT MOOD, THE CHINESE COULD WELL PUT ME IN AN EMBARRASSING OR INDEED HUMILIATING POSITION: IT THEY DID SO THIS WOULD BE BAD FOR HONG KONG IN GENERAL, AS WELL AS FOR ME PERSONALLY. THIS IS CLEARLY A RISK. SO TOO IS THE POSSIBILITY THAT, AT A HIGH LEVEL AND MAYBE IN FRONT OF JOURNALISTS OR LEAKED AFTERWARDS, THE CHINESE MIGHT REPEAT THEIR DEMAND THAT ALL WORK ON THE AIRPORT SHOULD CEASE UNTIL THEY AGREE IT. THAT WOULD FORCE ME TO RESPOND IMMEDIATELY. I COULD ONLY DO SO BY NOT AGREEING TO WHAT THE CHINESE SAID, THUS SPIRALLING THE CONFRONTATION.
2.
MANY MEMBERS OF EXCO WOULD PREFER THAT I SHOULD ARRANGE TO BE CALLED BACK FOR CONSULTATIONS WITH A VIEW TO HIGH LEVEL INTERVENTION WITH THE CHINESE BY THE FOREIGN SECRETARY. I AM NOT ATTRACTED TO THIS OPTION SINCE IT CREATES A FURTHER SENSE OF CRISIS AND LAYS A SERIES OF TIME BOMBS OF THE ''WHAT ARE YOU DOING NEXT'' VARIETY. ALSO, I ASSUME THE SECRETARY OF STATE IS UP TO HIS EYES IN THE GULF CRISIS.
3. THE ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST POSTPONING THE VISIT TO PEKING ARE NOT CLEAR CUT. ON BALANCE I AM STILL INCLINED TO GO, BUT WITH SOME PRETTY HEAVY RESERVATIONS. TO SOME EXTENT THIS WILL DEPEND ON THE CHINESE RESPONSE TO WHAT LORD CAITHNESS SAID (BOTH SPEED AND CONTENT OF WHICH MUCH APPRECIATED) AND TO WHAT ALAN DONALD WILL SAY IN PEKING.
4.
THERE IS ANOTHER FACTOR WHICH COULD BE DECISIVE. THE GULF. ILLOGICAL THOUGH IT MAY SOUND SINCE WE ARE NOT DIRECTLY INVOLVED, I WOULD NOT WISH TO LEAVE HONG KONG IMMEDIATELY AFTER FIGHTING BREAKS OUT. NOR WOULD I WISH TO FIND MYSELF IN CHINA WHEN FIGHTING
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