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The US attitude behind them could not have been misunderstood. Administration were very conscious that if the Americans took too nign a profile, that would be the kiss of death. They therefore intended to continue to proceed with clarity but discretion.
4. Sir D Gillmore said that he understood and respected that position. But we needed to establish some basic principles in the context of NATO so as to ring-fence the problem. A European security and defence identity was fine, in fact the British were all for it. But it had to be in NATO and so on. It could not be a rival to the Alliance. He thought that time was running out to get anything further into the Communique. But it would be possible for the President to make a statement that others, not even the French, would reject. нe repeated that wŁU ought to be an autonomous, not a subordinate organisation. we needed to set our minds to these problems.
5. Mr Kanter said that the President could also set out positive NATO parameters at the press conference. The debate on the European security and defence identity seemed to proceed partly by Cartesian logic, which led inexorably to the proposition that defence would be a normal expression of the sovereignty of a future European state. The debate was also strongly influenced by certain political romanticism. When the Americans among others asked for example how new structures would be paid for they tended to get the answer that it was all a generation away. This amounted to political self-indulgence. Sir D Gillmore said he agreed. When one asked who would do what, when and where it was difficult to get clear answers. Paris and sonn for example gave diametrically opposed views as to the capability and functions of the Franco-German corps.
6. Mr Kanter said he wanted to take up Sir D Gillmore's earlier remarks about the Gulf War and the way it had destroyed some French illusions, particularly as to their conventional capability. He thought that French nuclear capability was also a wasting asset. He enquired whether there were still UK-French contacts on a stand-off missile. Sir D Gillmore said that this was at present on hold. The French would indeed still be interested as the British would be too. Some form of TASM would continue to be necessary. but the question was not on the immediate current agenda.
7.
Sir D Gillmore gave Mr Kanter an account of the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting. He also repeated to him what he had earlier said to Mr Solomon about or intention to sign an agreement with Hanoi on the Vietnamese Boat People. Lastly, he said he hoped to see Mr Kanter in London before too long. Mr Kanter said that he would indeed want to come to the UK, once he could get away.
29 October, 1991
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