UUU
b. E. WHSHINGTUN
6:13
FRGE 02
CONFIDENTIAL
From:
Minister
Date:
29 October, 1991
CC:
Sir David Gillmore
Minister (C)
neau of Cancery
Mr Tebbit
Mr Torry
FIL DLUWIC
private secretary
PUS'S CALL ON THE UNDER-SECRETARY FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS, STATE DEPARTMENT: 28 October, 1991
1. Sir D Gillmore began by stressing to Mr Kanter how important the Rome summit was in leading up to Maastricht. The CFSP debate in Europe was of seminal importance for the UK and the other members of the Atlantic Alliance. Mr Kanter agreed that we had major equities at stake. He understood that the PUS had been over the ground thoroughly with others, including with Mr Niles. wondered what Sir D Gillmore thought about the future dynamic of the Franco-German relationship.
The
2. Sir D Gillmore said that Gaullison been dependent on a bipolar world and on there being space between the two poles in which France could operate. Within that space there had been a French rider on the German horse. German unification had meant that the Germans had become too big and powerful for French direction. collapse of the USSR had meant an end to bipolarity. The fundamental premises behind French political thinking had therefore been removed. The inability of the French to put more than 10,000 troops in the field during the Gulf War had also been a painful revelation to them. Many of their illusions had been destroyed.
Mr
The French were now desperately worried as to how to hold Germany within a Western oriented world. The Germans for their part took what in some ways was a very similar view. The German Ambassador in London had said to him that Kohl wished to leave as his legacy for Germany an inability to act outside the confines of the EC. Kanter said that if France was motivated by concern about Germany why was it that we could not draw France closer to us? Instead we had to submit to periodic lectures. Sir D Gillmore said that it was indeed logical that we ought to be able to get together more in the new circumstances. He did not know what the true reason was for our inability to do this. The fact however was that there was a very severe lack or alrection from the Elysee. Mitterrana ala not like detail but had taken over the direction of French foreign policy. No one, even those closest to him, knew what the President really thought. This was a very unfortunate combination of
circumstances.
3.
Mr Kanter said that the Americans shared British puzzlement. They would like to see France drawn closer to NATO. They did not like the corrosive effects of what was turning out to be an EC versus Natu debate. London and wasnington were very much on tne same wave length. The Americans had been restrained in their public comment on the Franco-German proposals but had posed pointed questions in private at a high level, especially to the Germans.
CONFIDENTIAL
/The US
آرا