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where they had their reservations.
One
The responses from Bonn and Paris to the messages that had been sent there including at the
Both the French and the highest level, were, so far, not too bad.
He admitted that Germans agreed that we should not undermine NATO. there were some contradictory elements in the Franco-German proposals, and in particular in French explanations of them. related to whether or not German forces in the Franco-German unit Mr Niles would be inside or outside the NATO military structure. thought there might be something in the German argument that the Franco-German unit might be a way of hooking the French into the integrated structure by the back door. The Americans too had gone out of their way to try to conduct the Strategic Review in such a way as to permit the French to sign up to as much as possible. as ever, he remarked, it was hard to work either with or without the French.
But
4. Sir D Gillmore said that he was sceptical as to the argument on back door integration. Indeed one could argue the reverse, and
Mr that the French might be enticing the Germans out of the IMS. Niles said that below Mitterrand there was evident uncertainty as to what French policies really were. Mitterrand himself was unclear in his expositions. The President had had his contacts
This had also gone with him and had recently sent him a message. into the question of liaison with the Central and East European states. The proposition that a NATO effort in this area would conflict with CSCE did not stand up to serious examination. for example, had not got in the way of CSCE action over Yugoslavia. There would no doubt be other difficult situations in Eastern Europe for CSCE conflict prevention machinery to work on.
NATO,
5. Sir D Gillmore said that he heard what Mr Niles sald about the French position including the suggestion that the mechanics of the Franco-German proposals could imply less aloofness on the part of the French towards NATO's integrated military structure. Even if this admirable objective seemed attainable, but there were basic
French principles nonetheless which ought to be set out clearly. and German emissaries had tended to come back from Washington saying that this that or the other of their proposals had been The mentioned to the Americans, who had raised no objections. British did not want to be the last on the beach head in defence of what we believed to be important bottom lines. One of these was that NATO was the only international organisation charged with the Mitterrand and Rumi Mr Niles said he thought this had A second principle was that no European structure should be set up in competition with NATO. Mr Niles said that the Americans had said this in many ways. Their present line was to stress the
Sir D Gillmore virtues of the IMS and the vices of duplication. said that a third principle was that WEU should not be subordinated to the EC. He had to say however that most of our partners in the
Mr Niles said that EC saw such subordination coming at some stage.
was indeed so but that the Germans took comfort in the idea that
/the
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