SECRET UK EYES A
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and argument on issues which will have been decided by the time the paper goes to the COS: notably the patrol craft and the future of the Gurkhas. It might be more sensible to leave these sections blank and simply insert the agreed position in a later draft.
3. Fourth, I note that the COS are asked to sign up to substantive recommendations on a number of key issues notably the command and control of the Brunei garrison and the likely sequence of events for the last six months - without any substantive discussion other than in rather impenetrable Annexes. Surely something specific ought to appear in the body of the paper on these issues, particularly the latter. Finally, I find the various sections on the run down of support services pretty unconvincing. I would be happier about the (very) gradual run down of support units if I was persuaded that the same degree of taut management as applies in UK units was being applied in Hong Kong. But I am not: the rather casual rejection of the greater use of civilian resources for medical and educational support is a case in point.
4. All that said, and subject to the more detailed comments attached, I do not have too many problems with the draft recommendations as they stand, which, broadly speaking appear to be on the right lines.
SECRET UK EYES A
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