to make clear that the MOD's two immediate targets
- Endurance and the Hong Kong Patrol Craft - are high priorities which should not be touched.
3.
The MOD are half reconciled to losing the battles
over Endurance and the Patrol Craft. They will not be
mollified by our suggestion that savings should be sought
instead through cuts in the Hong Kong and Falklands Garrisons, which do not fit in with current MOD planning.
Nor will they be impressed by the offer to slim other activities out of area, since they are already budgetting
on the assumption of cuts in Gibraltar and Cyprus.
But they will find it harder to handle our reply if we
can show that we are open to cuts and are not simply
insisting on the status quo.
4. I should underline two policy assumptions which are
reflected in the minute:
(i) that we should be willing to plan for Belize
to be defended by rapid reinforcement from the UK rather
than by a resident garrison. This would save large sums, provided that the MOD disbanded the battalion that was withdrawn. It will be easier to contemplate if the new
Guatemalan government accepts the draft agreement negotiated by its predecessor. But the PUS's meeting concluded that we should be willing to make contingency plans for winding up the garrison even if there is no early movement on the political front though it recognised that the removal of the garrison would weaken
Belize's negotiating position;
(ii) that, although the shrinking of the Royal Navy
will affect naval deployments out of area, we should not