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Turning to matters affecting the Garrison more directly, Sir David said that:
4.
5.
a.
b.
the Garrison continued to perform its duties very well;
the transfer of border-post responsibiliies from the Army to the Civil Police was going well;
C. the decision to retain the Patrol Craft was welcome because it dealt with the problem of creeping Chinese encroachment at sea and helped to allay fears of being abandoned by the UK.
Commenting on the patrol craft, PUS said that the MOD had been disappointed by the outcome but he did not intend to pursue the matter at this meeting. As to the DCA we had no thought of changing the ratio.
6.
Responding to CDS's question about how the transition in security and defence terms could be conducted smoothly, Sir David said that:
7.
a.
on the security front, he was encouraging the build-up of police relations with their Chinese counterparts. Special Branch presented a particular problem which he was tackling separately;
b.
contact between the Armed Forces and the Chinese Army was more difficult to establish, even though it was clearly essential to discuss a number of subjects, notably Lands. It could be that contact would be more readily
re-established in London, but this would need political approval.
PUS suggested that the discussion should turn to the Garrison, Vietnamese Boat People and Lands:
a.
Garrison. CGS explained the nature of the problem he faced in matching the run-down of the Garrison to the available resources. ACDS (0) was keeping the withdrawal plan under review. ACDS (0) elaborated by explaining that the general view now was that while the withdrawal of the first battalion could go ahead on time, subsequent withdrawals might have to be delayed. The position of LEP/LECS was intimately connected: unless a larger number of passports could be granted to LEP/LECS, there was a risk of disaffection/collapse of morale on a significant scale.
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