DUU
GUVERNMENT HUUSE
HUNG KUNG
91
6-14 14:22
PHGE ?
CONFIDENTIAL #
might fund 100%. This would require Finance Committee's approval. The tasks currently performed by the garrison in support of the HKG are, in brief, assistance with anti-illegal immigration and anti-smuggling operations. These are clearly within the ambit of the tasks which it is envisaged in the DCA should be funded on a 65:35 basis. As the Army and RN have been involved in such duties for a number of years, it would be difficult to present a convincing case to Finance Committee that their role had changed significantly in this regard.
Only if additional resources were deployed to Hong Kong specifically for these tasks would there be a good case for HKG to pay 100%. MOD assistance with VBPs is accepted as being outside the normal tasks of the garrison; Hong Kong pays 100% of the cost of this assistance (though in practice in recent years MOD's 35% has been met by a deduction from funds made available by the FCO as a contribution to VBP costs.)
111 way forward cost savings
16.
To provide funds to meet MOD's 35% share of the operating cots of the patrol craft between 1992 and 1997, the HKG proposes that -
(a)
the number of patrol craft and crews be reduced from three to two, and,
(b) MOD critically examine whether current
operating and support levels could be reduced to generate savings. A possible area could be a reduction in the strength of the Royal Air Force and/or Army Air Corps, particularly given that the Police will have taken over all sectors of the border by 1992, with air support provided by the RHKAAF.
The proposal at (a) will generate some £2m in savings per annum, of which MOD's 35% share would be some 0.7m. It would be for MOD to consider how much more could be saved as a result of (b).
17.
The HKG dues not accept MOD's position that the identification of savings is irrelevant to the future funding of the patrol craft, and that all potential cost-savings are either being implemented, or have been anticipated in forward financial planning. We think that a critical review of garrison operating costs, possibly in