I'm not a sanguine
as you. We're
dealing with Communish
Hugs,
Remember
20%
2
подви
Mrlax
✓ 25%
CONFIDENTIAL
On'x' the short answer is that we sho
The Clunese (first by quiet diplomacy, pren her, it recevay, by publicity) to disipline their forces
Alternativer, give your enthusiasm for cooperation with China, why not encourage the Marine Police to work Mr Burns much more closely wit PLA Nam
well before 1997
>
того
FROM: A R Paul
Ms
fogni
Vtp/w
ли
Hong Kong Department
DATE: 20 June 1991
HONG KONG: ROYAL NAVAL PATROL CRAFT
cc: Mr Cox ✔
Ms Coglin
1. When I called on the Governor in Hong Kong last week, he registered strongly his concern and disappointment over the reaction of the Secretary of State on patrol craft. He said he would have to raise the matter with the Prime Minister, at least in general terms. I suggested that it might therefore be helpful if we alerted Sir Percy Cradock to this. Will you speak to him or should I?
2.
I should add that Mr Galsworthy was extremely exercised
about this subject. He had urged the Governor to send a personal telegram direct to the Secretary of State setting out the military case for retention of the craft. He thought that Ministers would find it more difficult to "evade the issue" if formally confronted with the facts in
this way.
•
I too confess to being somewhat perplexed to Ministers' attitudes to this. The CBF and all the military in Hong
Kong have stressed the case for retention of the craft (to which, of course, must be added the political and strategic arguments). How would Ministers expect the Hong Kong marine police to deal with a situation of growing incursions, unofficial or official, on the part of the Chinese Navy at some point between now and 1997?
ARIANC
(His own
tel was
low-key)
X
A R Paul
* Because
ut was
Confines to
the
specho
IMPAFC/1
CONFIDENTIAL
quosher 7 elleur on coup
with Chine