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013254 MDHIAN 2418
DIFFICULTIES WITH THE CHINESE OVER DEFENCE LANDS.
5. THE MOD PROPOSAL THAT THE HONG KONG GOVERNMENT SHOULD TAKE OVER THE MANNING AND OPERATION OF THE PATROL CRAFT FROM 1992 DOES NOT I REGRET, DEAL WITH THE PROBLEM. THE REASON FOR WISHING TO KEEP THE PATROL CRAFT IS NOT ONLY BECAUSE THEY ARE LARGER THAN THE CHINESE GUN BOATS OPERATING HERE, BUT BECAUSE THEY ARE ROYAL NAVY RATHER THAN MARINE POLICE BOATS. THEY WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR THE MARINE POLICE TO OPERATE, AND THE FACT THAT THEY WERE NOT UNDER ROYAL NAVAL COMMAND WOULD REDUCE THEIR VALUE AS A DETERRENT. THE WHITE ENSIGN MATTERS. FURTHERMORE, TO PROCEED IN THIS WAY WOULD CLEARLY INVOLVE SEEKING APPROVAL FROM FINANCE COMMITTEE FOR THE VERY SUBSTANTIAL EXTRA FUNDS THAT WOULD BE NECESSARY, WITH THE ASSOCIATED POLITICAL DISADVANTAGES (PARA 3 ABOVE). CHINESE CONCERN ABOUT THE DEPARTURE OF THE ROYAL NAVY
WOULD REMAIN.
6. ONE FURTHER POINT NEEDS TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT. WE ARE NOW BEGINNING THE REVIEW OF THE RUN-DOWN AFTER 1992. I HAVE PREVIOUSLY ADVISED THAT I SEE A NEED TO KEEP A SLIGHTLY LARGER
CONTINGENT OF LAND FORCES FOR LONGER THAN ORIGINALLY ENVISAGED.
CBF SHARES THIS VIEW. IT WOULD PLACE US IN AN INTOLERABLE
POSITION IF MOD ARGUED THAT ANY CHANGE RESULTING FROM THE 1992 REVIEW MEANT THAT ANY ADDITIONAL COSTS SHOULD BE BORNE BY THE
HONG KONG GOVERNMENT ALONE RATHER THAN COMING WITHIN THE DCA.
7. YOU WILL RECALL THAT MR MAUDE DISCUSSED THIS MATTER WITH MOD
MINISTERS FOLLOWING MY TELNO 1310 OF 1990. I HOPE THAT LORD
CAITHNESS WILL NOW BE WILLING TO TAKE UP WITH HIS MOD
COUNTERPARTS THE VERY REAL DIFFICULTIES THAT THEIR CURRENT POSITION CAUSES FOR BOTH HKG AND, BY EXTENSION, HMG ITSELF.
WILSON
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DISTRIBUTION
18
MR MCLAREN MR BURNS
ΜΑΙΝ
18
LIMITED
HKD
PS/LORD CAITHNESS