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Chinese are prepared to take more liberties with the Marine Police than with the Navy. It is therefore most important that the white Ensign remains visible in Hong Kong in the run up to 1997, and that there should be sufficient support for the Marine Police during this critical period.
But there are also wider strategic factors which
concern me. The Royal Naval presence in Hong Kong is
seen as a symbol of our commitment to the territory. If
the patrol boats were to be withdrawn, this would be seen in Peking and Hong Kong as a clear signal of a diminution
of that commitment. Events in the Falklands, following
the withdrawal of HMS Endurance in 1981, underline the
folly of lowering our guard in this way.
I well understand your budgetary difficulties,
particularly at the
But,
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in retaining the patrol craft (8/cost of £15 million to
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the MOD over 5 years between 1992 and 1997) are not all
As I explained that large The Governor is prepared to be as flexible as possible over the financing arrangements, within the
DCA
overall parameters of the Defence Costs Agreement (DCA).
But he is understandably most reluctant to have to
re-open the DCA, which as you know, generated much bitterness locally, most of it directed at the British
Government. A bruising public row now would be all the more damaging when the Finance Committee of the Legislative Council has just approved a contribution of
£15 million towards HMG's costs arising from the Gulf
War.
I think it would be not unreasonable to find some way to give Hong Kong some credit for this important political gesture.
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In sum, I strongly believe that the military and
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