BACKGROUND
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References A: Sir Michael Quinlan's letter of 4 February
B:
Lord Caithness' letter to Mr Hamilton dated
18 February
C:
Mr Hamilton's letter to Lord Caithness dated
26 February
1.
The MOD have not included funds for a Royal Naval
Presence in Hong Kong in their forecasts for beyond 1991/92.
Initially this was on the basis that the 1987 Garrison Withdrawal Plan provided only for a continuing requirement
for the Royal Navy's three Peacock Class patrol craft until
1991 when the Hong Kong Marine Police (MARPOL) would be
ready to assume the Royal Navy's deep water anti-illegal
immigrant role. But that plan stated that the position
would be reviewed in 1990. The review concluded that there
was a need for a continued presence until 1997 but the MOD
did not consider that there was a military need: the need
was political.
The Case for a continued Naval Presence
2. The Hong Kong Government have argued strongly for the
retention of the three Peacock Patrol Craft until 1997:
· An operational case, resting on the need for a credible Royal Navy capability to uphold Hong Kong's
territorial integrity and to counter a possible erosion
of Hong Kong's sea borders by Chinese vessels. HQBF
Hong Kong see such incursions as now more likely and
potentially more confrontational than when the Garrison Withdrawal Plan was originally drawn up. They cite the increasing number of incidents (mostly in early/mid
1990) when Chinese patrol vessels had ignored
instructions from MARPOL to stop. (However, the Chiefs
MOPADZ/1
VAS
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