GENERAL
SECRET
UK EYES A
ANNEX F
TO_D/ACDS (CONCEPTS)108/5 DATED
OCT 91
UK C31 CAPABILITIES FOR OOA OPERATIONS
1. The need to be able to conduct operations 00A imposes a continuing requirement for the ability to communicate world- wide. The variety of possible needs in OOA operations
dictates that communication facilities be flexible.
Increasingly, vital operational, intelligence and logistic information will be held in computer based information systems, while the availability of sensor information will continue to grow. This, coupled with the need for real time, or near real time, information flow, means that the demand for communications capacity will continue to increase, both
between the UK base and the 00A force and within the force
itself. Because of this general increase, and because of the
size of the force involved, Operation GRANBY placed demands on communications far exceeding anything previously planned for OOA, necessitating the urgent provision of additional communications and CIS facilities, which would be required again in any future 00A operation of this scale. A further factor in OOA operations is that the proliferation of new technology will significantly enhance the EW and SIGINT threat, implying that the EPM protection afforded to communications OOA will have to be as comprehensive as that
provided for NATO operations.
COMMUNICATIONS
2.
Strategic Rear Links. The primary means of communication to a force deployed OOA is almost always satellite. Only SATCOM offers the reliability and high capacity required for modern secure speech and data systems. Although SATCOM can be jammed under certain circumstances, future satellites will incorporate improved resistance to jamming and the advantages of SATCOM will continue to outweigh the risks for the
F-1
UK EYES A SECRET