MIDENTIAL
4. Lord Caithness asked whether The Philippines were restricting ASEAN's economic development and making convergence more difficult. BG Yeo thought not. The Philippines were "not fully functional, but not non-functional". Philippine reluctance to cut tariffs had, however, been a problem. The overall situation was manageable providing that The Philippines did not go Communist. BG Yeo added that integration in Southeast Asia had been accomplished more as a result of economic action by the US, Japanese and overseas Chinese than by political action on the part of the indigenous races.
Thailand
5. BG Yeo thought that the Thais had done well because they had successfully assimilated their Chinese population (all now carried Thai names). They were now the energetic element in Thai society. The Thais had also not had to cope with the type of religious problems faced by, for example, the Malaysians. Buddhism was a more tolerant religion.
6. BG Yeo did not think that the Thai coup would affect matters generally. Thai democracy had been regarded by many as a joke. Standing for election was seen as an investment. Prem had run a professional administration but control had then been lost. The Thais had to be understood on their own terms. Like Indonesia, which was held together by the Armed Forces (the next Indonesian President would have to come from the Armed Forces), Thailand was held together by the monarchy and the Army. There were messages for others in the way the Thais conducted their affairs and resolved their differences. Thailand would eventually return to democracy but would do this in her own way. The Thais were survivors. The Singapore Armed Forces trained in Thailand and had good links with the Thai Army. They could not "demonize" Thai Generals as a casual observer might.
7. Lord Caithness said that this was a useful regional perspective which he would note carefully. He added that he had seen Chatichai recently in London. Compared with his autumn 1990 visit, he had appeared rejuvenated. He had announced that he would be returning to Thailand to receive a medal and had been welcomed back by the King and the Army. BG Yeo said that he had no doubt that the FCO was "infinitely more subtle than the State Department in such matters".
Burma
BG Yeo said that everyone was "very upset" by the SLORC's refusal to hand over power. The people of Burma had been betrayed. But, again, it was important to take an historical perspective. Burma was held together by the Armed Forces and Buddhism. Things were unlikely to change while Ne Win remained in power.
But we should not wish a Philippine situation on Burma. We would have to see how things worked out, although Yeo feared that there would inevitably have to be a ruction. Lord Caithness agreed that people in the West (and in particular the press) tended to jump to conclusions without fully understanding the facts. He referred to a speech he had made the previous day to a group of British businessmen in which he had said that it was not for Britain to draw up a blueprint for a regional security arrangement for Asia. We could not expect changes in Burma overnight. But the human rights situation there was a legitimate cause for international concern. We could not simply ignore abuses but we were limited by our lack of contact with the SLORC. BG Yeo said that we should make contact: we lived in an imperfect world and diversity of approach (multiple points of contact) was necessary to ahdnle a tricky situation. Lord Caithness agreed.
cont'd