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OF STATE UNDERTOOK TO PASS THIS MESSAGE ON. HE HAD DISCUSSED KOREA WITH THE CHINESE FOREIGN MINISTER AND HAD EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT CHINA WOULD NOT BLOCK AN APPLICATION FOR UN MEMBERSHIP BY SOUTH KOREA. HE HAD BEEN GIVEN A REASONABLY ENCOURAGING REPLY. NAKAYAMA SAID THAT JAPAN HAD BEEN CONDUCTING DISCUSSIONS WITH NORTH KOREA WITH A VIEW TO NORMALISING RELATIONS. THEY HAD TOLD THE NORTH KOREANS THAT A DIALOGUE WITH THE SOUTH WAS IMPERATIVE. SO WAS AN IAEA SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT. INDEED, THESE WERE CONDITIONS FOR THE NORMALISATION OF RELATIONS JAPAN WOULD NOT COMPROMISE ON THESE POINTS. JAPAN WAS PARTICULARLY CONCERNED BY NORTH KOREA'S POLICY ON MISSILE EXPORTS. AS TO UN MEMBERSHIP, JAPAN FAVOURED SIMULTANEOUS ACCESSION BUT IF NORTH KOREA WOULD NOT AGREE, THEN JAPAN WOULD HAVE NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO SUPPORT A SOUTH KOREAN
APPLICATION.
ENEMY STATES CLAUSE.
B
9. NAKAYAMA SAID THAT THE JAPANESE PEOPLE COULD NOT ACCEPT THE EXISTENCE OF THE ENEMY STATES CLAUSE MUCH LONGER IT WAS MORE THAN 40 YEARS SINCE THE WAR HAD ENDED. THE SECRETARY OF STATE AGREED THAT THE CLAUSE WAS AN ANACHRONISM AND HE WAS THEREFORE SYMPATHETIC TO THE JAPANESE CONCERN. THE PROBLEM WAS THAT THIS WOULD INVOLVE CHANGING THE UN CHARTER AND WAS NOT, THEREFORE, EASY. WE WERE WILLING TO DISCUSS WAYS OF MAKING PROGRESS, PERHAPS INITIALLY WITH THE OTHER PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. NAKAYAMA SAID THAT BAKER HAD PROMISED HIS SUPPORT FOR DELETION OF THE CLAUSE. WHEN NAKAYAMA HAD RAISED THE QUESTION WITH BESSMERTNYKH, HE HAD PROMISED SOVIET SUPPORT FOR A DECLARATION TO NULLIFY THE CLAUSE. THE JAPANESE THOUGHT THAT ANY SUCH DECLARATION WOULD NEED TO MAKE CLEAR THAT THE CLAUSE WOULD BE DELETED IN THE NEAR FUTURE. THE SECRETARY OF STATE THOUGHT THIS IDEA WORTH CONSIDERING.
NORTHERN TERRITORIES.
10. NAKAYAMA SAID THAT THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE TO KAIFU HAD BEEN RECEIVED WITH GRATITUDE. KAIFU HAD NOW REPLIED. THERE HAD BEEN NO CONCRETE DISCUSSION OF THE NORTHERN TERRITORIES WHEN BESSMERTNYKH HAD BEEN IN TOKYO BUT THEY HAD AGREED THAT THEY WOULD BE DISCUSSED WHEN GORBACHEV VISITED JAPAN ON 16 APRIL. MUCH DEPENDED UPON GORBACHEV'S DECISION BUT THE RUSSIAN REPUBLIC WAS ALSO INVOLVED. THE RUSSIAN FOREIGN MINISTER HAD ACCOMPANIED BESSMERTNYKH WHEN HE VISITED TOKYO AND THERE WAS A DANGER THAT THE SUBJECT WOULD BECOME A DOMESTIC ISSUE IN THE SOVIET UNION.
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