CONFIDENTIAL
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MDHIAN 1699
SHOW FLEXIBILITY.
5.
IN LIGHT OF THAT ASSESSMENT IT SUGGESTS THAT OUR TACTICS SHOULD BE TO SHOW THE MAXIMUM FLEXIBILITY TO CONSIDERING LEGCO'S VIEWPOINT OVER THE NEXT FEW MONTHS BUT WITHOUT GIVING THAT BODY ANY RIGHT TO THINK IT CAN EXERCISE A VETO OVER THE FORM OF LEGISLATION PUT TO THE CHINESE. IF AT THE END OF THAT PERIOD LEGCO ARE STILL RELUCTANT TO MODIFY THEIR OWN POSITION WE NEED TO LOOK CAREFULLY AT THE CONSEQUENCE OF DECIDING TO DELAY THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CFA UNTIL MUCH NEARER 1997. THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE WHICH FOLLOWED THE PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT REFERRED TO OUR HOPE TO ESTABLISH THE COURT AS SOON AS FEASIBLE. FAILURE TO BRIDGE THE GAP BETWEEN WHAT THE CHINESE ARE CONTENT TO ALLOW AND WHAT LEGCO INSIST ON HAVING WILL HAVE CONSEQUENCES FOR CONFIDENCE IN THE EFFECTIVE GOVERNMENT IN HONG KONG WHICH GO FAR BEYOND THE IMPORTANCE OF THE CFA ITSELF. THIS SUGGESTS THAT TOWARDS THE END OF THE CONSULTATION PERIOD THERE WILL BE ROOM FOR A MUCH STRONGER LEAD BY HKG AND EVEN MINISTERS MEETING WITH IMPORTANT HONG KONG POLITICAL FIGURES. IN THE MEANTIME IT MIGHT HELP IF A STREAM OF ROUTINE BUSINESS ON IROS ETC COULD BE PUT THROUGH LEGCO TO CONDITION THEM TO THE IDEA THAT NOT ALL ISSUES DISCUSSED WITH THE CHINESE NECESSARILY LEAD TO TREATMENT IN A CONTENTIOUS MANNER.
6. WE SUSPECT THAT ATTITUDES RELEVANT TO DETERMINE THE ELECTIONS IN 1995 WILL BE RADICALLY DIFFERENT TO THOSE PERTAINING IN 1991. WE DOUBT WHETHER THE CFA AS SUCH WILL BE A MAJOR INFLUENCE ON THE OUTCOME, UNLESS IT HAS COME TO STAND AS A SYMBOL OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CHINA, HONG KONG AND HKG AND HMG. SEEN FROM HERE THE MAJORITY OF THE POPULATION IN HONG KONG WILL BY 1995 BE MUCH READIER TO ACCOMMODATE THE REALITIES OF THE SITUATION.
WE FULLY AGREE THAT IF IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO OBTAIN, WHERE NECESSARY, AGREEMENTS REACHED IN THE JLG, THE JLG PROCESS WILL ITSELF BE SEVERELY UNDERMINED.
COATES.
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