IO
DIRECTOR OF
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fact complied with the requirements of section 5, appointment thus made would be valid.
the
For these reasons, in adultion to those given by my
Lord Fuad, I am unable to sustain the decision of the judge that the purported delegation (or sup-delegation) by the Jovernor under section 5 diu not carry with it the power
conferred under Article IV.
(3)
AX.
The Judicial Service Co.minission Oruanance (cap. 92)
1 f section 15(a) of the Judicial Service Commission
erdinance were required to be given a restricted meaning and
Urdinance made it mandatory for the Governor to receive
advice from the Commission before a magistrate could be
appointed, I would accept that there could be impressive
arguments to support the contention trat the appointment of
Line by the Chief Justice was invalid. I was at first
inclineu to give section 15(a) a restricted meaning as Jeing
intenued to oe declaratory and by way of statutory reminder
that although the Commission was required by section こ to
advise the Governor regarding the filling of vacancies in
Judicial offices, nevertheless the power to fill those
vacancies remained with the Jovernor wno was not coilyeu by the Croinance to accept the Commission's advice or prevented
from consulting such other sources as ne thought fit.
However, as the argument developed, it seemed to me
to be clear that not only was there no provision in the Ordinance obliging the Governor to act on the Commission's
advice put (as in the case of section 15 (a) of the Public
Service Commission Ordinance ( (Cap. 93)) the terms or section
15(a) were too explicit to be given a restricted meaning. Mr. Keane sought to rely on the word "vesting", as contrasted with "as to how such power should be exercised"
in section 15 (p), to indicate that section 15 (a) did not
apply to the manner of exercise of the Governor's power to